

Journal of Indological Studies

(New title for *Studies in the History of Indian Thought*)

Articles

- Kyoko AMANO, *etád vā eṣābhyānūktā* in the Maitrāyaṇī Saṃhitā:
— The Beginning of Didactical Verse Embedded in Narrative Prose — 1
- Kenji TAKAHASHI, The “Mental” (*Mānasa*) Self and Mānasa the Creator
in the *Bhṛgubharadvājasamvāda* (*Mahābhārata* 12.175–185) 15
- Raffaele TORELLA, Camatkāra 39
- Chojun YAZAKI, A Transmission of Patañjali’s Interpretation
in the Cāndra Grammatical Tradition 73

Association for the Study of the History of Indian Thought
c/o Department of Indological Studies
Graduate School of Letters
Kyoto University

Editorial Committee Yuko YOKOCHI (Editor-in-Chief)
Mieko KAJIHARA
Yuto KAWAMURA
Hideki TESHIMA
Kengo HARIMOTO
Som Dev VASUDEVA

Studies in the History of Indian Thought (15 nos., 1981–2003) was renamed
Journal of Indological Studies in 2005.

© March 2023

Association for the Study of the History of Indian Thought
(President: Akihiko AKAMATSU)
c/o Department of Indological Studies
Graduate School of Letters
Kyoto University
Yoshida Honmachi, Sakyo-ku, Kyoto 606-8501, Japan

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced
without permission of the Association.

Printed by Nakanishi Printing Co. Ltd., Kyoto, Japan

Journal of Indological Studies

(New title for *Studies in the History of Indian Thought*)

Articles

- Kyoko AMANO, *etād vā eṣābhyānūktā* in the Maitrāyaṇī Saṃhitā:
— The Beginning of Didactical Verse Embedded in Narrative Prose — 1
- Kenji TAKAHASHI, The “Mental” (*Mānasa*) Self and *Mānasa* the Creator
in the *Bhṛgubharadvājasaṃvāda* (*Mahābhārata* 12.175–185) 15
- Raffaele TORELLA, *Camatkāra* 39
- Chojun YAZAKI, A Transmission of Patañjali’s Interpretation
in the Cāndra Grammatical Tradition 73

The “Mental” (*Mānasa*) Self and Mānasa the Creator in the *Bhṛgubharadvājasamvāda* (*Mahābhārata* 12.175–185)

Kenji TAKAHASHI

1. Introduction

In the dialogue between Bhṛgu and Bharadvāja (*Bhṛgubharadvājasamvāda*, BhBhS) found in *Mahābhārata* (MBh) 12.175–185, Bhṛgu teaches that the Self exists as Fire or Wind in one’s head (MBh 12.178). Bharadvāja is deeply skeptical about Bhṛgu’s teaching and harbors serious doubt about the idea of the Self as such. After questioning the continuity of the Self after death (MBh 12.179.1–180.10; cf. Takahashi [2019b]), Bharadvāja continues his argument by saying that if the mind (*manas*) controlled perception and was the agent of joy and so on, then there would be no need for the Individual Self (*jīva*) (MBh 12.180.11ff.). In reply to this, Bhṛgu explains that the Inner Self, said to be “mental” (*mānasa*), governs the perception of sensory objects. This discourse further contains two accounts of the creation of the universe by a deity named Mānasa (Account I [MBh 12.175.11–37] and Account II [MBh 12.176.2–4]), as well as another account of creation in which neither Mānasa nor any other directing deity is mentioned (Account III [MBh 12.176.6–17]).

The BhBhS is subdivided into the following sections: three different versions of creation (175–176); the five elements of the movable and immovable beings (177); the Self as Fire (178); Bharadvāja’s question (179); discussions of the Self as Fire (180); and *varṇadharma* and *āśramadharma* (181–185). The BhBhS is partly parallel to MBh 3.203 in the dialogue between a righteous hunter and Kauśika (*Dharmavyādhakauśikasamvāda* in MBh 3.198–206, DhKS).¹ MBh 12.178 is parallel to MBh 3.203.13–30b and MBh 12.180.23–29 to MBh 3.203.30c–35. The DhKS records only the presentation of the Self as Fire or Breath, and does not contain any corresponding questions, discussions on the “mental” Self, or accounts of creation. A comparison of the two versions indicates that the redactor(s) of the BhBhS added Bharadvāja’s questions, Bhṛgu’s further elaboration of the Self in MBh 12.179.1–180.22, and the descriptions of creation (MBh 12.175–177) to a hitherto unknown common source on which the two versions are based (cf. Takahashi [2019b: 1055]). This paper attempts to analyze the sense in which the Self can be regarded as “mental” (*mānasa*) in the BhBhS, and how the microcosmic discussions in MBh 12.179–180 are related to the

¹ I would like to thank James L. Fitzgerald for making me aware of this parallel relationship between the BhBhS and the DhKS.

cosmogonies found in MBh 12.175–177.

2. Internal Fire or Wind as the Self

Bharadvāja asks Bhṛgu how Fire and Wind function in one’s body (MBh 12.178.1). Bhṛgu replies:

MBh 12.178.3–4 (cf. MBh 3.203.15a–d, 16c–f)
śrito mūrdhānam agnis tu śarīraṃ paripālayan /
prāṇo mūrdhani cāgnau ca vartamāno viceṣṭate // 3 //

Fire, on its part, is located in the head, protecting the body. Breath, existing in the head and in Fire, moves [throughout the body].

sa jantuḥ sarvabhūtātmā puruṣaḥ sa sanātanaḥ /
mano buddhir ahaṃkāro bhūtāni viṣayāś ca saḥ // 4 //

It (Breath) is the living being, the Self of all beings. It is eternal Puruṣa. It is the mind, intellect, I-awareness, the elements, and sensory objects.

Verse 3 conceives the head as the central part of the body where Fire and Breath abide,² although the heart is generally considered to be the seat of the Self in Ancient India (cf. Olivelle [2006]). Frauwallner [1925: 60] believes verse 4 is a later interpolation because the Sāṃkhyan doctrine appears only sporadically in the BhBhS; however, the incongruity in content does not prove that this verse is unoriginal. The fact that the DhKS also has a corresponding verse (MBh 3.203.16c–f) indicates that this verse indeed appears in the common source upon which the BhBhS and the DhKS are based. Still, because none of these terms appear again in the shared part of the BhBhS and the DhKS, we can conjecture that this verse was intended to glorify Breath by casting it to Sāṃkhyan terms, and the BhBhS did not intend to expound on these terms. From verse 5 onwards, Bhṛgu explains the roles that the five Breaths (*prāṇa*, *samāna*, *apāna*, *udāna*, and *vyāna*) and digestive Fire play in one’s body. At the end of the chapter, Bhṛgu concludes his discussion:

MBh 12.178.16c–17 (cf. MBh 3.203.28c–f, 30ab)
jītaklamāsanā dhīrā mūrdhany ātmānam ādadhuḥ // 16cd //

² Izawa [2020] demonstrates that in the liturgical descriptions of the Agnicayana ritual, severed heads that are to be placed under the altar are thought to be deprived of *indriyas* or *prāṇas*, and the texts ordain to restore the seven *prāṇas* by ritual actions. In this context, however, we have to note that the *prāṇas* do not necessarily refer to the five or ten Breaths but most likely refer to a group of the vital functions whose first member is the Breath (elliptical plural). cf. also Izawa [2018].

The wise who conquered fatigue and mastered seated postures placed the Self in the head.

*evam sarveṣu vihitāḥ prāṇāpāneṣu dehinām /
tasmin sthito nityam agniḥ sthālyām iva samāhitaḥ // 17 //*

In this way, Fire,³ which is disposed in all the *prāṇas* and the *apāṇas* of the embodied beings, always stays there (in the head), like [a fire] placed in a cauldron.

In the DhKS, MBh 3.203.30ab, which corresponds to MBh 12.178.17cd, is immediately followed by the statement that identifies Fire with the Self (MBh 3.203.30c *ātmanam taṁ vijānīhi*). In the case of the BhBhS, however, long discussions between Bhṛgu and Bharadvāja concerning the validity of the Self as Fire or Wind (MBh 12.179.1–180.22) intervene between MBh 12.178.17 and MBh 12.180.23a which corresponds to MBh 3.203.30c. Consequently, this identification of Fire and the Self is not evident from Bhṛgu’s discussion in MBh 12.178.

Another interpretative problem in Bhṛgu’s presentation is the distinction between Fire and Breath/Wind. The functions of Fire and Wind seem to coincide with those of each other: Breath is considered to constitute the essence of a human being (MBh 12.178.4), and Fire also appears to be identified with the Self (MBh 12.178.16c–17, MBh 12.180.23a); both Fire and Breath are located in the head (MBh 12.178.3). Still, the description that Breath is located in the head and in Fire (MBh 12.178.3c *prāṇo mūrdhani cāgnau*) suggests that there is a slight distinction between the two, though from the above description, it is not quite clear which one is superior to the other. Bharadvāja seems to understand the Self as both Fire and Wind because he poses objections to the ideas of both the Self as Wind and the Self as Fire (MBh 12.179.1–2). The intention of the shared part of the BhBhS and the DhKS could have been to conflate the doctrine of Breath with that of Internal Fire.

On the other hand, when answering Bharadvāja’s criticism, Bhṛgu consistently regards the Self as Fire: he does not offer any response to Bharadvāja’s contention that if Wind were something active, the Individual Self would be meaningless. Moreover, Bhṛgu identifies the Individual Self as Fire and thinks that Fire supports the Breaths (MBh 12.180.7ab *prāṇān dhārayate hy agniḥ*

³ Because the digestive Fire is said to be placed in the middle of the *prāṇa* and *apāna* in verse 10 (*apānaprāṇayor madhye prāṇāpānasamāhitaḥ [...] samyak pacati pāvakaḥ*), I understand that the subject of 17ab is Fire, which is mentioned in 17cd. Alternatively, it is also possible to interpret that the subject of 17ab is *ātman* “the Self” mentioned in the immediately preceding verse (*ātmanam* in 16d).

sa jīva upadhāryatām). As argued earlier, Bharadvāja’s refutations and Bhṛgu’s answers found in MBh 12.179.1–180.22 were most likely added to the common source of the BhBhS and the DhKS. Therefore, the understanding of the Self as Fire in MBh 12.180.7ab may not reflect the intention of the shared part of the BhBhS and the DhKS (MBh 12.178).

3. Bharadvāja’s Questions and Bhṛgu’s Replies in MBh 12.179.1–180.10⁴

Bharadvāja is deeply skeptical of what Bhṛgu preaches. The purport of Bharadvāja’s objection against Bhṛgu is that if the Self were identified with Fire or Wind, at the time of death, it would dissolve into Fire or Wind outside the human body, and the continuity of the Self would be interrupted. Bhṛgu first answers Bharadvāja’s question by saying that the Self in the body does not perish, just as Fire does not perish even when the firewood is burned up (MBh 12.180.1–2). Nevertheless, his answer is easily refuted by Bharadvāja because once the firewood is burned up, there is no possibility that Fire will arise out of nothing (MBh 12.180.3–4). Then Bhṛgu says, even when the firewood is fully consumed, Fire continues to exist, but it is not perceived. It follows Space, so it is deprived of its support (MBh 12.180.5). Similarly, when the Self abandons its body, it continues to exist, but it is not perceived because it is very subtle (MBh 12.180.6). At the moment of death, Fire as the Self and Wind, which supports Fire, dissolves into Space, and the corporeal part of the body (Water and Earth) dissolves into Earth. Therefore, the Self becomes invisible, but it does not follow that it perishes (MBh 12.180.8–10).

4. Bharadvāja’s Further Doubts

Bharadvāja further asks Bhṛgu what the Individual Self is like if a body consists of the five elements (MBh 12.180.11–12). He argues that when one’s body is being destroyed, the Individual Self is not observed (MBh 12.180.13). Then, Bharadvāja offers a potential opposition against himself from Bhṛgu’s side:⁵

MBh 12.180.14

yady ajīvaṃ śarīraṃ tu pañcabhūtasamanvitam /

⁴ See Takahashi [2019b] for an analysis of this part of the text.

⁵ I follow Fitzgerald’s [1980: 374] interpretation here. At first sight, it is difficult to attribute this verse to Bharadvāja because it takes the form of a question and Bharadvāja answers to it in verse 15. In fact, the bulk of manuscripts in the Southern recension attribute verse 14 to Bhṛgu: Before 14, manuscripts D₇ T_{1, 2} G_{1, 3, 6} M_{1, 5, 7} insert *bhṛgur uvāca* “Bhṛgu said,” and the same manuscripts insert *bharadvāja uvāca* (*bhāradvāja uvāca* in T₂) after 14. For the issue of the speaker attributions in the Southern transmission, see Takahashi [2021:60–61]. In this paper, the manuscript information is taken from the Poona Critical Edition (Sukthankar et al. [1936–1966], hereafter PCE).

śārīre mānase duḥkhe kaś tāṃ vedayate rujaṃ //

If a body is devoid of an Individual Self and is endowed with [only] the five elements, then who experiences the pain of the physical [and] mental suffering?

Bharadvāja then answers this potential opposition:

MBh 12.180.15

*śṛṇoti kathitaṃ jīvaḥ karṇābhyāṃ na śṛṇoti tat /
maharṣe manasi vyagre tasmā jīvo nirarthakaḥ //*

The Individual Self hears what is told.⁶ [The Individual Self] does not hear it (what is told) with two ears, O great seer, when the *manas* is distracted. Therefore, the Individual Self is unnecessary.

After stressing that one does not perceive anything when the *manas* is not active (MBh 12.180.16–17), Bharadvāja questions who is the experiencer of joy and so on (MBh 12.180.18). The purport of Bharadvāja’s argument is to point out an undesired consequence in Bhṛgu’s statements, namely that one can dispense with the Individual Self if perception can be explained by the *manas*. This does not mean that Bharadvāja himself advocates the notion of selflessness, although it is not impossible that the redactor(s) of the BhBhS had the Buddhist idea of selflessness in mind.

5. Bhṛgu’s Reply to Bharadvāja’s Question

In reply, Bhṛgu answers that the Inner Self is the true experiencer of perception:

MBh 12.180.19

*na pañcāśdhāraṇaṃ atra kiṃcic charīraṃ eko vahate ’ntarātmā /
sa vetti gandhāś ca rasāñ śrutiṃ ca sparśaṃ ca rūpaṃ ca guṇāś ca ye ’nye
// 19 //*

guṇāś’ Ś₁ K_{1, 2, 4, 6, 7} V₁ B_{0, 6, 9} Ds₁ D_{2, 4, 5, 7, 9} T₂ G_{1-3, 6} M_{1, 5-7}; *guṇāś* B_{7, 8} Da_{3, 4} Dn_{1, 4} Ds₂ D_{3, 6, 8}; *gaṇāś* T₁.

⁶ Fitzgerald [1980: 374] translates verse 15 as “(But you may say,) ‘The soul hears what is said.’ But, *maharṣi*, one does not hear with the ears if the mind is distracted, and so the soul is superfluous.” He interprets pāda a as a continuation of a potential question from Bhṛgu’s side. As the statement in pāda also asserts the existence of an Individual Self, Fitzgerald’s rendering is one of the possible ways of interpretation. In the above translation, however, I posit that pāda a (*śṛṇoti kathitaṃ jīvaḥ*) and pādas bc (*karṇābhyāṃ na śṛṇoti tat maharṣe manasi vyagre*) draw a contrast between the state of the Individual Self with functioning *manas* and that with distracted *manas*. The purport of the verse would thus be that if it is the *manas* that determines whether the Individual Self perceives the sensory objects, then the Individual Self is superfluous.

There is nothing equal to the five [elements] in this regard. The Inner Self alone moves the body. It perceives smells, tastes, sound, touch, and appearance. Whatever other properties [there are, it perceives them].

For the syntactical interpretation of pādas ab, I follow Fitzgerald [1980: 374]’s translation (“In it there is nothing based upon the five. The single inner *ātman* carries the body.”).⁷

Nīlakaṇṭha, a seventeenth-century commentator on the MBh, analyzes pādas ab as follows:

Bhāratabhavadīpa ad MBh 12.180.19 (MBh 12.187.19 in Kinjawadekar’s edition. Part 5, p. 324, ll. 28–33)

yathā śrotrādīnām śabdādigrāhakatvena grāhyasajātīyaguṇāśrayatvena ākāśādirūpatvam, evaṃ mano ’pi sarvaguṇagrāhakatvāt sarvaguṇāśrayatvena pāñcabhautikam / atas tan na kiṃcid bhūtebhyo ’nyat tattvāntaram pāñcasādhārāṇatvāt / atas tan na śarīranirvāhakaṃ, kiṃ tu ekaḥ antarātmaiva śarīraṃ sthūlasūkṣmabhedena dvividhaṃ vahate cālayati /

The the faculty of hearing etc. have the nature of Space etc. on account of their being a locus of properties similar to their objects of perception, because they are the perceivers of sound etc. Similarly, the *manas* also consists of the five [elements] on account of being a locus of all the [five] properties, because it is the perceiver of all [the objects of perception]. Therefore, it (the *manas*) is not another principle different from the elements, because of the equality with the five [elements]. Therefore, it (the *manas*) is not the mover of the body, but the Inner Self alone moves (*vahate*) the body, [in other words,] makes [the body] move, in two ways, by the division of gross and subtle [ways].

Interestingly, Nīlakaṇṭha interprets the *manas* as being equal to the five elements

⁷ Deussen & Strauss [1906: 160] translate pādas ab as “In the case of all, the body which is composed of the five elements is not able to do anything, and only the Inner Self governs it (= the body, supplied by the present author)” (“Bei dem allen vermag der aus den fünf Elementen zusammengefügte Leib nichts, und nur der innere Ātman regiert ihn”). It appears that they understand pādas ab as *na pāñcasādhārāṇaṃ* (nom.) *atra kiṃcit* (acc.) *śarīraṃ* (nom.) (*vahate?*), *śarīraṃ* (acc.) *eko vahate ’ntarātmā*. They interpret *śarīraṃ* both as nominative and as accusative, which is not impossible but unnatural. The reason why Deussen & Strauss relate *pāñcasādhārāṇa* with *śarīra* appears to be that these two words are used in apposition in MBh 12.179.7ab (see above). Motegi [1995: 71], on the other hand, translates the same part as “The single internal self does not move any body whose basis is the five kinds” (五種を基体とするいかなる身体も単一なる内的自我 [antarātman] は動かすことはない), suggesting that the Inner Self is not involved in physical activities, but this interpretation does not seem to be plausible because the immediately following pādas cd say that it is the Inner Self that governs perception.

(*pañcasādhāraṇa*). If we follow Nīlakaṇṭha’s understanding, we can paraphrase pādas ab as *na pañcasādhāraṇaṃ [manah] kiṃcic charīraṃ vahate, eko [śarīraṃ] vahate ’ntarātmā*.

The word *pañcasādhāraṇa* is puzzling. *Sādhāraṇa* originally means “having the same basis,” “common,” “common to,” and it can mean “equal to, similar to” (cf. Böhtlingk & Roth [1855–1875. VII: 911]; *Harivaṃśa* App. I.18.873 *mṛtyusādhāraṇe raṇe*). This word is used in apposition to *śarīra* in MBh 12.179.7ab, in which Bharadvāja poses a doubt on the concept of the Individual Self (MBh 12.179.7ab *pañcasādhāraṇe hy asmin śarīre jīvitam kutaḥ* “If this body is equal to the five [elements], from where does the life [come into being]?”). One could translate *pañcasādhāraṇa* literally as “having the same basis as that of the five [elements],” but the common basis of the five elements and the body is not specified in the text. Considering the fact that the body is also called *pañcātmaka* “whose essence is the five [elements]” in the following verse 20, I translated *sādhāraṇa* as “equal to,” which is also supported by Nīlakaṇṭha’s understanding (*atas tan na kiṃcid bhūtebhyo ’nyat tattvāntaram pañca-sādhāraṇatvāt*).

It is true that the *manas* is related to the five elements as the perceiver of the properties of the five elements in the way that Nīlakaṇṭha explains, but the association of the *manas* with the five elements does not prove their identity. In fact, the BhBhS neither equates the *manas* with the five elements nor states that the *manas* consists of the five elements. Considering the fact that the word *pañcasādhāraṇa* is used in apposition to the body (*śarīra*) in MBh 12.179.7ab, it appears natural to understand that MBh 12.180.19ab is intended to mean that what moves the body is not the physical body itself but the Self. Still, Nīlakaṇṭha’s explanation gives an answer to Bharadvāja’s question of who the experiencer is: it is not the *manas*, but the Inner Self.

Considering these circumstances, I have avoided interpreting what is modified by the word *pañcasādhāraṇa* is the *manas*, but instead have translated *na pañcasādhāraṇaṃ ... kiṃcit* more generally, as “nothing that is equal to the five [elements]”—so that one **could** construe the *manas* as one of the entities that are said to be “equal to the five [elements]” (*pañcasādhāraṇa*).

Bhṛgu continues:

MBh 12.180.20–21

*pañcātmake pañcaguṇapradarśī sa sarvagātrānugato ’ntarātmā /
sa vetti duḥkhāni sukhāni cātra tadviprayogāt tu na vetti dehaḥ // 20 //*

This Inner Self perceives the five qualities within [the body] whose essence is the five [elements] and follows all the limbs. It perceives suffering and

happiness here (in this body). But, when the body is separated from the [Inner Self], it does not perceive [suffering and happiness].

*yadā na rūpaṃ na sparśo noṣmabhāvaś ca pāvake /
tadā śānte śarīrāgnau dehaṃ tyaktvā sa naśyati // 21 //*

dehaṃ tyaktvā sa naśyati] Ś₁ K_{1, 2} B_{8PC(marg.)} M_{1, 5-7}; *dehatyāge na naśyati*⁸
K_{4, 6, 7} V₁ B_{0, 6, 7, 8AC, 9} D_{a3, 4} D_{n1, 4} D_{s1, 2} D₂₋₉; *dehaṃ tyaktvā na naśyati* T_{1, 2}
G₁₋₃.

When there is no appearance, touch, or warmth in Fire, then, as the Fire of the body is extinguished, [the Inner Self] leaves the body, and it (the body) perishes.⁹

Bhṛgu's words do not seem to answer Bharadvāja's doubt directly. Although Bharadvāja argues that one does not perceive anything when *manas* is not active, Bhṛgu stresses only that the agent of perception is the Inner Self.

MBh 12.180.22

*ammayam sarvam evedam āpo mūrtilḥ śarīriṇām /
tatrātmā mānaso brahmā sarvabhūteṣu lokakṛt //*

⁸ PCE reports this as *dehatyāgena naśyati*.

⁹ The referent of *sa* in pāda d is difficult to decide. As the word *agni* "Fire" and *deha* "body" appear in the locative and accusative, respectively, the referent of *sa* could be *antarātman* "the Inner Self" in verse 20. However, if interpreted in this way, this verse would deny the continuity of the Inner Self after death ("after leaving the body, the Inner Self perishes"). This position is opposite to that of Bhṛgu, who holds that the Self does not perish at the time of death (MBh 12.180.2ab *na śarīrāśrito jīvas tasmin naṣṭe praṇaśyati* "When one's body perishes, the Individual Self that dwells in it does not perish"). In order to resolve this difficulty, Motegi [1995: 71] interprets the subject of the absolute clause (*dehaṃ tyaktvā*) as being the Inner Self, and that of the main clause (*sa naśyati*) as the body (*deha*): "[the inner self] abandons the body, and [the body] perishes" ([靈魂は] 身体を捨て、それ [身体] は滅するのである). Although it is not syntactically preferable, I follow Motegi [1995: 71] because his understanding mirrors 20d *tadviprayogāt tu na veti dehaḥ* "But, when the body is separated from the [Inner Self], it does not perceive [suffering and happiness]." It would be possible to take the subject of this sentence as the Inner Self and render *naś* as "disappear," but, because Bhṛgu himself uses this word to denote complete annihilation of existence, this interpretation is not adopted here. Another possible solution is found in manuscripts K_{4, 6, 7} V₁ B_{0, 6, 7, 8AC, 9} D_{a3, 4} D_{n1, 4} D_{s1, 2} D₂₋₉ (*dehatyāge na naśyati* "when [the Inner Self] abandons the body, it does not perish") and T G_{1-3, 6} (*dehaṃ tyaktvā na naśyati* "[the Inner Self] does not perish [even] when it abandons the body"). They render pādas d as a negative sentence so that it reflect Bhṛgu's argument. In this case, however, it would be difficult to choose these readings because the reading *dehaṃ tyaktvā sa naśyati* is supported both by the core of the Northern-Western manuscripts (Ś₁ K_{1, 2}) and by the Malayalam manuscripts (M_{1, 5-7}), whose agreement is considered to be original in many cases. Alternatively, one could attribute this verse to Bharadvāja, who is skeptical of the continuity of the Self after death, but because this point is not revealed in the subsequent discussions, this interpretation is not adopted here.

This whole [world] consists of Water. Water is the substance for the embodied beings. In it (*mūrti*), the **mental** Self is Brahman,¹⁰ the Creator of the world within all the beings.

This “mental” Self seems to be identical with the Inner Self mentioned in verse 19. I shall discuss how this verse could provide an answer to Bharadvāja’s question after having a look at Bhṛgu’s full discourse.

In the following passage (MBh 12.180.23–29), Bhṛgu teaches the Self’s distinction from the body, its imperishableness, and the difficulty of its perception. These verses correspond to MBh 3.203.30c–35 in the DhKS.

In MBh 12.179.1–180.18, Bhṛgu and Bharadvāja use only the word *jīva*, but we find that in MBh 12.180.19–30, Bhṛgu uses three other different words for the Self: *antarātman* “the Inner Self,” *ātman* “the Self” and *kṣetrajña/kṣetravid* “the Knower of the Field.” The Individual Self (*jīva*) appears to be slightly inferior to the Self (*ātman*), which is identified with the Knower of the Field (*kṣetrajña*):

MBh 12.180.23–25 (cf. MBh 3.203.30–33, MBh 12.233.18–20)
ātmānam taṁ vijānīhi sarvalokahitātmakam /
tasmīn yaḥ saṁśrito dehe hy abbīndur iva puṣkare // 23 //

Know that he (the mental Self as Mānasa) is the Self, whose essence is salutary for the entire world. It abides in this body like a drop of water on a lotus.

kṣetrajñaṁ taṁ vijānīhi nityaṁ lokahitātmakam /
tamo rajas ca sattvaṁ ca viddhi jīvaguṇān imān // 24 //

Know that it (*ātman*) is the eternal Knower of the Field, whose essence is salutary for the world. *Tamas*, *rajas*, and *sattva*—know these as the properties of the Individual Self.

sacetanaṁ jīvaguṇaṁ vadanti sa ceṣṭate ceṣṭayate ca sarvaṁ /
tataḥ paraṁ kṣetravidaṁ vadanti prāvartayad yo bhuvanāni sapta // 25 //

They say that the property of the Individual Self is animate: It (the Individual Self) moves and makes everything move. They say that what is higher than it (the Individual Self) is the Knower of the Field who has set the seven worlds in motion.

Pāda 24a identifies *ātman* with *kṣetrajña*. The fact that the similar adjectives *sarvalokahitātmaka* and *lokahitātmaka* modify *ātman* (23b) and *kṣetrajña* (24b)

¹⁰ In this paper, I use the accent in order to distinguish the masculine deity (Brahman) and the neuter principle (Brāhman), which are often written as Brahman and Brahman, respectively.

respectively in neighboring verses also indicates that *ātman* and *kṣetrajñā* are considered to be identical. Verse 25 suggests that *jīva* is something different from *ātman* and *kṣetrajñā*.¹¹ The word *jīva* here refers to the aspect of the Self in the realm of actual life, whereas *kṣetrajñā* (= *ātman*) is superior to *jīva* and it can be identified with the Creator of the world (25cd). In the above translation, I interpret *tataḥ* in pāda c as referring to *jīva* or *jīvaguṇa*. Grammatically, it is possible to understand *tataḥ* as related to *yo* in pāda d; pādas cd could thus be translated as “Know that the Knower of the Field is higher than the one who has set the seven worlds in motion,” but this interpretation is not adopted here for it is difficult to assume that the Self or the Knower of the Field is conceived superior to the Creator.

After stressing the difficulty of perceiving the Self (26–29), Bhṛgu concludes his teaching:

MBh 12.180.30

mānaso 'gniḥ śarīreṣu jīva ity abhidhīyate /
sṛṣṭiḥ prajāpater eṣā bhūtādhyātmaviniścaye //

The mental Fire in the bodies is called “the Individual Self.” [The doctrine of] this Prajāpati’s creation [is taught] for the ascertainment of the elements and what concerns the Self.

Bhṛgu’s discourse on the Self ends here, but how can his words be an answer to Bharadvāja’s questions?

6. Frauwallner’s Interpretation of *Mānasa*

Although the BhBhS has mostly been overlooked in previous studies, Frauwallner [1925] is an important exception to the general lack of interest in this text. Frauwallner [1925: 63] comments on MBh 12.180.30 as follows:

We see that the old idea of *agnir vaiśvānaraḥ*, which also forms the basis for the doctrine of Śāṇḍilya and Yājñavalkya in the older Upaniṣads, is presented here [in the BhBhS]. As there [in the doctrine of Śāṇḍilya and Yājñavalkya], the *ātman* is considered to be the one perceiving; and when it is explicitly called *mānaso 'gniḥ* here, we may well suppose that the *ātman* coincides with *manas* here as in the Śāṇḍilya doctrine. (Translated from German by the present author)

Chāndogyopaniṣad 3.14.2–3 says, “[It is] made of *manas* (*manomaya*); *prāṇas*

¹¹ See Johnston [1937: 44–45] for other passages in Upaniṣads and the MBh where *jīva* as an individual transmigrating soul is contrasted to *ātman* or *kṣetrajñā*.

are its body; luminosity is its appearance; its plan comes true; Space is its essence; it is endowed with all actions, all desires, all smells and all tastes; it has reached above this everything; it neither speaks nor pays any heed. This Self (*ātman*) of mine [exists] within the heart ...”¹² (*manomayaḥ prāṇasarīro bhārūpaḥ satyasamkalpa ākāśātmā sarvakarmā sarvakāmaḥ sarvagandhaḥ sarvarasaḥ sarvam idam abhy ātto*¹³ *’vāky anādarah // 2 // eṣa ma ātmāntar hṛdaye ...*) The adjectives *satyasamkalpa ... sarvakarmā sarvakāmaḥ sarvagandhaḥ sarvarasaḥ* explain why the Self can be regarded as made of *manas*: the Self governs the intentions, actions, desire and the perception of sensations, functions that are generally ascribed to the *manas*.

Likewise, in the BhBhS also, the Individual Self, which is identified with *mānasa-agni* (30), is said to govern the perception of sensory objects (19–20b), which is often attributed to the *manas*. Although Frauwallner does not explicitly say so, it appears that he takes *mānasa* in the BhBhS as a synonym for *manomaya* “made of *manas*” in the Śāṇḍilya’s doctrine. Therefore, Frauwallner’s interpretation does somehow provide an answer to Bharadvāja’s question: the Individual Self is not superfluous. It coincides with the *manas* as it performs the functions of the *manas*, such as the perception of objects and so on.

7. *Mānasa* “Mental” vis à vis *Śārīra* “Physical”¹⁴

Frauwallner’s [1925] interpretation of the Self as functioning as the *manas* seems appealing when we look only at the expressions *tatrātmā mānaso* in 22c and *mānaso ’gniḥ śarīreṣu* in 30a, but it is not without its problems: first, the text does not identify the Self with the *manas* elsewhere in the BhBhS, apart from one dubious passage (MBh 12.178.4, see Section 2) where Breath is identified with the Self, the *manas*, and other Sāṃkhyan principles such as *buddhi*, *ahaṃkāra*, and others. This passage is too weak to serve as evidence that the BhBhS considers the functions of the Self to overlap with those of the *manas*. Secondly, verse 22 as a whole does not seem to be intended as a direct answer to the problem of the *manas*, and it is difficult to decide from the neighboring contexts what verse 30 intends by its use of the word *mānasa*.

In verse 19, Bhṛgu stresses that the Inner Self moves the body and governs the perception of objects. Verses 20 and 21 say that the Inner Self in the body experiences happiness and suffering and that when the Self leaves the body, the body dies and does not perceive anything. In this way, verses 19 to 21 seem to

¹² The above translation is based on Olivelle [1998: 209]’s rendering.

¹³ Gotō [1996: 98–97, n. 6] argues that *ātta* is a Prākṛt form of *āptā*, which is found in the parallel passage in *Śatapathabrāhmaṇa* 10.6.3.2 (*abhy āptām*).

¹⁴ I would like to thank Francesco Sferra for his suggestion for this section.

presuppose a distinction between the Self and the body. In 22ab, Bhṛgu rather abruptly remarks that everything is made of Water (22a: *ammayam sarvam evedam*) and that Water is the substance for embodied beings (22b: *āpo mūrṭiḥ śārīriṇām*). Bhṛgu then says that *ātman* is *mānasa*, Brahman, who is the Creator of the world within all the beings (22cd: *tatrātmā mānaso brahmā sarvabhūteṣu lokakṛt*). In the light of its preceding context, verse 22 can best be understood as clarifying the distinction between the body and the Self: whereas the substantial form of the body consists of Water, the Self is “mental,” most likely in the sense that it is devoid of substantial forms, and the Self is identical with the Creator. The relationship between Bhṛgu’s discourse in MBh 12.180 and the creation accounts in the BhBhS will be investigated in the following sections.

The BhBhS occasionally refers to the distinction between what is physical or substantial and what is mental or insubstantial. At the moment of death, Bhṛgu explains that the Wind in one’s body enters Space, and Fire as the Self follows the Wind. Finally, the oneness of Space, Wind, and Fire ensues (MBh 12.180.7–9, cf. Takahashi [2019: 1057]). Then Bhṛgu says that Space, Wind, and Fire should be considered as devoid of substantial form (*amūrṭi*), whereas Water and Earth are substantial (*mūrta*).¹⁵ As Bhṛgu regards the Self as Fire, this distinction between Water as substantial and the Self as insubstantial found in MBh 12.180.22 accords with the classification of the five elements into the substantial and the insubstantial in MBh 12.180.7–10. In MBh 12.180.14cd, Bharadvāja asks who perceives the affliction in bodily and mental suffering (*śārīre mānase duḥkhe kas tām vedayate ruḥam*; see Section 4). Although this statement is not made by Bhṛgu, MBh 12.180.14cd also suggests that *mānasa* is used in contrast to *śārīra* “physical.”

It is difficult to decide precisely what the *mānasa* of verse 30 means. It appears equally possible to understand *mānasa* in 30a as “coinciding with the *manas*” or as “mental” in contrast to “physical.”

An interpretative problem in understanding *mānasa* as “mental” or “insubstantial” is that if interpreted this way, Bhṛgu’s replies do not directly answer Bharadvāja’s point that there is no need to postulate the Self if the *manas* governs the perception and so on. Bhṛgu’s model of a human existence focuses mainly on the five elements and the Self and does not attach great importance to the *manas*: Bhṛgu refers to the clearness of *citta* in the process of attaining the

¹⁵ MBh 12.180.10: *yatra kham tatra pavaṇas tatrāgnir yatra mārutaḥ / amūrtayas te vijñeyā āpo mūrṭās tathā kṣitiḥ* // One could translate *mūrṭi* as “material form,” but the difference between the *amūrṭi* elements (Space, Wind, and Fire) and *mūrta* elements (Water and Earth) seems to lie not in whether a particular element is “material,” because *amūrṭi* elements are also material, but in whether it has a certain definite tangible form.

imperishable happiness in MBh 12.180.29,¹⁶ but apart from this passage, the dubious identification of the Wind with the *manas* in MBh 12.178.4, and the word *mānasa* in MBh 12.180.22, 30, Bhṛgu makes no mention of the *manas* or its synonyms in his teaching of the Self. Considering these circumstances, we could surmise that Bhṛgu’s answer to Bharadvāja’s question concerning the *manas* is obscure because he does not regard the *manas* as one of the constituents of a human being.

Frauwallner’s [1925] interpretation of *mānasa* also has its strong points: his interpretation solves the problem of the relationship between the Self and the *manas*; he traces the idea of the Self as consisting of the *manas* to the teachings of Śāṇḍilya in the *Chāndogyaopaniṣad*. Considering the relative merits of these two understandings of *mānasa*, I would like to leave both as possible interpretations.

Although our discussions of the word *mānasa* have so far been confined to a psychological level or the level of individual human existence, the BhBhS uses this word in a different meaning: it is the name of the Creator of this world. The identification of the Self with the Creator found in MBh 12.180.22cd suggests that the author of this passage also intended this second meaning.

8. Mānasa the Creator in *Mahābhārata* 12.175.11–37 (Account I)

The BhBhS has three different accounts of creation: Account I in MBh 12.175.11–37; Account II in MBh 12.176.2–4; and Account III in MBh 12.176.5–26. The first two hold that the primordial deity is Mānasa, whereas the last one does not mention any directing deity. The following sections examine how Mānasa is represented in Accounts I and II.

At the request of Bharadvāja, Bhṛgu relates the creation of the universe by Mānasa:

MBh 12.175.11–14
mānaso nāma vikhyātaḥ śrutapūrvo maharṣibhiḥ /
anādinidhano devas tathābhedyo ’jarāmaraḥ // 11 //

[There exists] a god, who is known by the name Mānasa, whom great sages have heard from ancient times, without beginning and end, inseparable, and beyond aging and death.

avyakta iti vikhyātaḥ śāśvato ’thākṣaro ’vyayaḥ /
yataḥ sṛṣṭāni bhūtāni jāyante ca mriyanti ca // 12 //

¹⁶ MBh 12.180.29: *cittasya prasādena hitvā karma śubhāśubham / prasannātmātmani sthitvā sukham akṣayam āśnute //*

He is known as “the unmanifest,” eternal, imperishable, and undecaying. Out of him,¹⁷ beings are emitted, and [within him] they are born and die.

so 'śṛjāt prathamam devo mahāntam nāma nāmataḥ /¹⁸
ākāśam iti vikhyātam sarvabhūtadharāḥ prabhuḥ // 13 //

The divine being, the bearer of all beings, the Lord, first emitted what is called “the Large” (*mahant* m.) by name, which is known as “Space.”

ākāśād abhavad vāri salilād agnimārutau /
agnimārutasaṃyogāt tataḥ samabhavan mahī // 14 //

From Space, Water came into being, and from Water, Fire and Wind [came into being]. Then from the mixture of Fire and Wind, Earth came into being.

It should be noted that the order of the five elements (Space, Water, Wind, Fire, Earth) is slightly different from the most common order in Indian thought (Space, Wind, Water, Fire, Earth).

From Earth, Mānasa emits a divine lotus from which Brahmān comes into being (MBh 12.175.15). This Brahmān is described as follows:

MBh 12.175.16
ahaṃkāra iti khyātaḥ sarvabhūtātmabhūtakṛt /
brahmā vai sumahātejā ya ete pañca dhātavaḥ //

He (Brahmān) is known as *ahaṃkāra* and is the Self of all the beings as well

¹⁷ In the light of 1a-c (*kutaḥ sṛṣṭam idaṃ viśvaṃ jagat sthāvarajaṅgamam / pralaye ca kam abhyeti*), *yatas* in pāda c is interpreted as an ablative in the sense of “out of which,” and *yasmin* “into or within which” is supplied in pāda d. It is also possible to interpret *yatas* in the sense of “because of him, on account of him”; in this case, pādas cd could be translated as “On account of him, created beings are born and die.”

¹⁸ Manuscripts K₆, 7 Da₃ Dn₁, 4 Ds₁, 2 (Ds₁ marg.) D₂₋₆, 8, 9 insert the following line after 13ab: *mahān sasarjāhaṃkāraṃ sa cāpi bhagavān atha*. Verse 13 could thus be read as follows:

MBh 12.175.13*
so 'śṛjāt prathamam devo mahāntam nāma nāmataḥ /
mahān sasarjāhaṃkāraṃ sa cāpi bhagavān atha /
ākāśam iti vikhyātam sarvabhūtadharāḥ prabhuḥ //

The god first emitted what is called “the Large” by name. The Large created *ahaṃkāra*. Then, the Lord, the Bearer of all the beings, [emitted] what is known as “Space.”

If read in this way, the creation process would be Mānasa → *mahant* → *ahaṃkāra* → Space. We can detect what Hacker [1961] called “Sāmkhyization,” i.e., the correction of texts in accordance with the doctrines of Īśvaraḥṣṇa’s *Sāmkhyakārikā* and its commentaries. It is also possible that this insertion was motivated by 21a, in which the Creator is said to be the Creator of *ahaṃkāra* (*ahaṃkārasya yaḥ sraṣṭā*), which we shall examine below.

as the Creator of beings. Brahmán of immense glow is these five elements.

The compound *sarvabhūtātmabhūta* “the one who becomes the Self of all the beings” is used ten times in the MBh, so it might also be possible to read *sarvabhūtātmabhūtakṛt* in pāda b as a Tatpuruṣa compound, *sarvabhūtātmabhūta-kṛt* “the Creator of the one who becomes the Self of all the beings.” However, I interpret this word as a Karmadhāraya compound *sarvabhūtātma-bhūtakṛt* in the light of MBh 12.180.22cd (*tatrātmā mānaso brahmā sarvabhūteṣu lokakṛt*). This passage suggests that Brahmán is the Self (*ātman*) within all the beings and, at the same time, the maker of the world. In this way, pāda b defines Brahmán on two different levels: as “the self of all the beings” (*sarvabhūtātmā*) at the microcosmic level and as “the Creator of beings” (*bhūtakṛt*) at the macrocosmic level. Then, various parts of his body are identified with various elements of this world (MBh 12.175.17–19). Bhṛgu continues:

MBh 12.175.20–21

sa eva bhagavān viṣṇur ananta iti viśrutaḥ /
sarvabhūtātmabhūtastho durvijñeyo 'kṛtātmabhiḥ // 20 //

No one but he is Lord Viṣṇu, who is widely heard as “the infinite.” He is the Self of all the beings and abides in beings. He is hard to be recognized by those who have not perfected their Selves.

ahaṁkārasya yaḥ sraṣṭā sarvabhūtabhavāya vai /
yataḥ samabhavad viśvaṁ prṣṭo 'haṁ yad iha tvayā // 21 //

The one who creates the *ahaṁkāra* in order to produce all the beings, and the one from whom the universe came into being — this is what you have asked to me about in this regard (i.e. the beginning of this world).

Verses 20 to 21 are confusing because 20ab (*sa eva viṣṇur*) seems to identify Viṣṇu with the lower Creator Brahmán; however, verse 21 says that Viṣṇu is the creator of *ahaṁkāra*, which is identified with Brahmán in verse 16, suggesting that Viṣṇu is higher than Brahmán. We can interpret verses 20–21 as intended to give a further glorify Brahmán by identifying him with Viṣṇu, but Bhṛgu did not pay heed to the consistency with verse 16. Alternatively, it is also possible that “the creator of *ahaṁkāra*” in 21a refers to Mānasa, and consequently, 20ab identifies Viṣṇu with Mānasa, not with Brahmán.

It should be noted that the description of Brahmán arising from the lotus which Mānasa made from Earth in the BhBhS is reminiscent of the famous Vaiṣṇava myth that Brahmán was born from the lotus arising from the navel of Viṣṇu. This might be one of the underlying motivations for the identification the

creator, whether he is Brahman or Manasa, with Viṣṇu.

After discussing the size of the universe, Bhṛgu describes Brahman as follows:

MBh 12.175.34

*tataḥ puṣkarataḥ sṛṣṭaḥ sarvajña mūrtimān prabhuḥ /
brahmā dharmamayaḥ pūrvāḥ prajāpatiḥ anuttamaḥ //*

pūrvāḥ] Ś₁ K₁, 2, 4, 6 B₀, 6-9 Dn₁, 4 Ds₁, 2 D₂ (both times), 3, 5, 8; *pūrvam* K₇ V₁ D₄, 6, 7, 9 T₁, 2 G₁₋₃, 6 M₁, 5-7; *pūrṇaḥ* Da₃, 4.

From the lotus, the omniscient, the lord endowed with a substantial form, Brahman, consisting of virtue, primordial (*pūrvā*), unsurpassed Prajāpati was emitted.

The word *pūrvā* means “preceding,” “prior,” “ancient,” “first,” or “initial.” It is not clear which meaning Bhṛgu intends, and this word triggers Bharadvāja’s question:

MBh 12.175.35

*puṣkarād yadi sambhūto jyeṣṭhaḥ bhavati puṣkaram /
brahmāṇaḥ pūrvajāḥ cāha bhavān saṁdeha eva me //*

eva] K₆, 7 V₁ B₀, 6-9 Da₃, 4 Dn₁, 4 Ds₁, 2 D₂, 3, 5-9 T₁, 2 G₁₋₃, 6 M₁, 5-7; *eṣa* Ś₁ K₁, 2, 4.¹⁹

If [Brahman] came into being from the lotus, then the lotus is the oldest. You said that Brahman was born first (*pūrvajā*). [This is] my very doubt.

Bharadvāja paraphrases *pūrvā* as *jyeṣṭha* “oldest” and *pūrvajā* “first-born.” It is also possible that Bhṛgu’s intention to use this word in MBh 12.175.34 is to mark the antiquity of this deity (*pūrvā* in the sense of “ancient”), not to specify the deity’s precise chronological position. I translate *pūrvā* as “primordial” so that it can accommodate this semantic ambiguity. Bhṛgu answers:

MBh 12.175.36

*mānasasyeḥa yā mūrtir brahmatvaḥ samupagatā /
tasyāsanavidhānārthaḥ pṛthivī padmam ucyate //*

The substantial form (*mūrti*) of Manasa here (in this world) has obtained Brahman-ness. In order to arrange a seat for him (Brahman), Earth is called the lotus.

¹⁹ PCE reads *eva*, but *eṣa* in Ś₁ K₁, 2, 4 may be a better reading.

Bhṛgu’s explanation does not seem to answer Bharadvāja’s question clearly. It appears, however, that Bhṛgu intended to defend his remark that Brahman is *pūrva* “primordial” by declaring that Brahman partakes of the primordialness of Mānasa, who is truly the oldest in the universe, as its embodiment.

9. The Creator Mānasa in *Mahābhārata* 12.176.2–4 (Account II)

In MBh 12.176.2–4, Bhṛgu recapitulates the account of creation but in a different way:

MBh 12.176.2

*prajāvisargaṃ vividhaṃ mānaso **manasā**sṛjat /*
saṃdhuḥṣaṇārthaṃ bhūtānāṃ sṛṣṭaṃ prathamato jalam //

Mānasa performed the manifold emission of creatures **with the *manas***. Water was emitted first in order to animate beings.

This passage indicates that the Creator is called Mānasa (“deriving from *manas*” or “related to *manas*”) because he created various creatures with his *manas*. Gonda [1983] demonstrates that in Vedic creation accounts the *manas* represents the intention or determination of the primordial entity to create this world. According to *Taittirīyabrāhmaṇa* (TB) 2.2.9, at the beginning of the world, the *asant* (the non-existent) made up its mind to exist (*māno ’kuruta syām iti*). After it practiced austerity, there arose smoke, sea, and others; then finally, Prajāpati arose. Then Prajāpati created this world (TB 2.2.9.1). Interestingly, the concluding part of this passage states that *manas* was emitted from the *asant* (TB 2.2.9.10 *āsato ’dhi māno ’sṛjyata*). Although Gonda [1983: 25–26] does not pay heed to the expression *māno ’kuruta* in TB 2.2.9.1, it contains a wordplay: it is used as an idiom “to make up one’s mind, to decide,” and, at the same time, it denotes that the *asant* literally “made” *manas*. This interpretation is confirmed by the concluding statement that *manas* was emitted from the *asant* (TB 2.2.9.10). This TB passage shows two aspects of *manas*: as the volition or decision of the primordial being but at the same time as the primordial entity in the process of creation. The idea of *manas* as the primordial intention to create this world, whether it belongs to a deity or an abstract entity, is inherited in the cosmogonies found in MBh 12.224–225 and in *Mānavadharmasāstra* 1 (cf. Bodewitz 1995, Takahashi 2019c: 130–132).

Bhṛgu then argues that this world is supported by Water:

MBh 12.176.3–4

yat prāṇāḥ sarvabhūtānāṃ vardhante yena ca prajāḥ /
parityaktāś ca naśyanti tenedaṃ sarvaṃ āvṛtam // 3 //

That which is the lives of all beings, by which the creatures grow, and being abandoned by which they perish, this whole [world] is covered by it (Water).

*pr̥thivī parvatā meghā mūrtimantaś ca ye 'pare²⁰ /
sarvaṃ tad vāruṇaṃ jñeyam āpas tastambhire punaḥ || 4 ||*

The Earth, mountains, clouds, and other objects that have substantial forms—the whole [world] is to be known as consisting of Water. Water, for its part, sustains [itself].

Bhṛgu does not give any explanation of the other elements.

One of the most conspicuous differences between Account I and Account II concerns Mānasa's first creation: whereas Account I holds that Mānasa first emitted Space and Water is emitted after Space, Account II states that Water was emitted first.²¹

10. Mānasa the Creator and the “Mental” Self

The following observations can be gleaned from the above analysis of the accounts of creation in the BhBhS:

- (1) Mānasa emitted the five elements, and Brahmán arose from the lotus which arises from Earth. Brahmán is considered to be the substantial form of Mānasa.
- (2) Mānasa (lit. “relating to the *manas*”) created the living beings with his *manas*, which represents creative intention in the context of cosmogony.
- (3) Brahmán is said to be the Self of all the beings (*sarvabhūtātman*) and the Creator of beings (*bhūtakṛt*).
- (4) Account II conceives that everything is made of Water.

These points indicate that MBh 12.180.22, where Bhṛgu refers to *mānasa* in his discussion of the Self, echoes the creation accounts found in MBh 12.175–176.

²⁰ For *ye 'pare*, PCE reads *ye pare* (without *avagraha*), but *apare* appears syntactically superior.

²¹ After the above cosmogony, the BhBhS relates another account of creation after the above cosmogony (Account III). Bharadvāja asks how Water, Fire, Wind, and Earth came into existence (MBh 12.176.5). Interestingly enough, Bharadvāja does not mention the production of Space. Bhṛgu then says that doubt about the origin of this world arose in Brāhmaṇa seers (MBh 12.176.6), and that Sarasvatī revealed the origin of the world to them (MBh 12.176.7–8). In the beginning, Space alone existed (MBh 12.176.9). From it, Water arose (MBh 12.176.10–12). Then Wind, Fire, and Earth arose successively (MBh 12.176.13–17). The order of the elements (Space, Water, Wind, Fire, Earth) concurs with that of Account I. At the same time, by postulating Space as the primordial substratum from which the other elements are produced, Water is presented as the first entity that comes into existence. In this sense, Account III also corroborates Account II.

MBh 12.180.22

*ammayaṃ sarvaṃ evedam āpo mūrtiḥ śarīriṇām /
tatrātmā mānaso brahmā sarvabhūteṣu lokakṛt //*

This whole [world] consists of Water. Water is the substantial form of embodied beings. In it (*mūrti*), the Self is mental/Mānasa, Brahmán, the Creator of the world within all beings.

The idea of Water as a substratum of the world and the identification of the Creator Brahmán with the Self in this verse are based on the teaching of creation in Accounts I and II. MBh 12.180.25 also refers to the identification of the Self and the Creator, saying that the Knower of the Field (*kṣetrajña*) is the one who has set seven worlds in motion (cf. Section 5). Moreover, the concluding statement in MBh 12.180.30cd says, “This [doctrine of] Prajāpati’s creation [is taught] for ascertainment of the elements and what concerns the Self” (cf. Section 5). As Brahmán is identified with Prajāpati in MBh 12.175.34 (cf. Section 8), we can infer that MBh 12.180.30cd intends to relate the creation accounts in MBh 12.175–176 with the microcosmic discussions concerning the Self and the five elements found in MBh 12.177–180.²²

This may suggest that when Bhṛgu uses the word *mānasa* in pāda c, he not only intends the meaning of “mental,” but also its cosmological meaning, namely, Mānasa the Creator. We can infer that the BhBhS intentionally used the word *mānasa* here to allude to the identity of the Self and the Creator.

Whereas Accounts I and II regard Brahmán as the substantial form of Mānasa, suggesting some difference between the two deities, MBh 12.180.22cd uses the words *mānasaḥ* and *brahmā* in apposition. Still, the fact that the BhBhS is the only extant text that advocates the deity named Mānasa and that the text repeatedly refers to the identification of the Creator and the Self indicates that the BhBhS purposefully uses *mānasa* for both the Self and the Creator.

How are the *mānasa* “mental” Self and Mānasa the Creator associated with each other? We have observed that there are two possible interpretations of the word *mānasa* “mental” in the context of the Self: as coinciding with the *manas* or as being insubstantial (cf. Sections 6 and 7).

Frauwallner [1925] argued that the adjective *mānasa* “mental” indicates that the Self covers the functions of the *manas* (Section 6). If we follow this interpretation, we can surmise that the BhBhS’s intention to identify the “mental”

²² Frauwallner [1953–1956. I: 131–132] remarks that the BhBhS lacks the doctrine of the world-soul like *brāhman* or *ātman* and the text adheres to the assumption of numerous souls different from each other. It is true that the BhBhS discusses *jīva* rather extensively, but at the same time, the BhBhS unmistakably identifies the Self with the Creator.

Self with Mānasa the Creator lies in validating the existence of such “mental” Self by relating it to the Creator’s desire or intention to create the worlds that the *manas* represents in the context of cosmogony.

In Section 7, the possibility of interpreting *mānasa* “mental” as “insubstantial” in contrast to “physical” or “substantial” was examined. As the Brahman, who was born from the lotus created by Mānasa is said to be the substantial form (*mūrti*) of Mānasa, it may not be impossible to argue that Mānasa himself is devoid of any substantial form, thus stressing the subtlety of the initial state of the creation process. We could argue that by identifying the “mental” Self and Mānasa the Creator, the BhBhS relates the microcosmic process in which the mental Self governs the physical body to the macrocosmic process in which Mānasa creates the phenomenal world. However, we must admit that the text does not explicitly say so and this interpretation remains a matter of conjecture.

11. Concluding Remarks

This paper analyzed the meaning of *mānasa* in the discourses on the Self and in the creation accounts of the BhBhS. The word *mānasa* does not appear in the portion shared with the DhKS and the BhBhS (MBh 12.178, 180.23–29), and the ideas of *mānasa* Self and Mānasa the Creator were introduced in those parts that the BhBhS most likely added (MBh 12.175–177, 179.1–180.22, 30). It was demonstrated that MBh 12.180.22 attempts to connect the discussions of the mental (*mānasa*) Self in MBh 12.179–180 and the creation accounts concerning Mānasa in MBh 12.175–177.

As intricate philosophical investigations are condensed into short discourses in the BhBhS, it is not always easy to clarify the purport of the text. Instead of proposing one conclusion, the present paper examined two possible interpretations of the word *mānasa*: as coinciding with the *manas* and as being insubstantial or not physical. The first interpretation was proposed by Frauwallner [1925]. He observed that the Self is represented as functioning as the *manas* in reply to Bharadvāja’s criticism that the Self would be superfluous if the perception etc. can be explained by the *manas*. As the *manas* in creation accounts can be regarded as the Creator’s intention to produce this world, we can infer that the BhBhS’s intention to use the same designation to the Self and the Creator lies in relating the Self to the Creator by referring to the microcosmic and cosmological functions of the *manas*. Although his interpretation has a strong point in tracing its source to the Śāṇḍilya’s discourse in the *Chāndogyopaniṣad*, we observed that the usage of the word *mānasa* in MBh 12.180.22 does not seem to support Frauwallner’s interpretation. Alternatively, it is also possible to interpret the word *mānasa* as referring to something insubstantial, especially in contrast to the

physical body. The BhBhS occasionally refers to the distinction between the insubstantial and the substantial. Although the word *mānasa* in MBh 12.180.22 can be best understood as stressing this distinction, it is also true that when we adopt the interpretation, we cannot find any clear answer to Bharadvāja’s question concerning the relationship between the Self and the *manas*. At the cosmological level, as Brahman is represented as the *mūrti* (substantial form) of Mānasa, in an admittedly speculative way, it may not be impossible to interpret the deity name Mānasa as suggesting the subtlety of the Creator. By identifying the mental Self and Mānasa the Creator, the BhBhS may have attempted to associate the dichotomy between the mental Self and the physical body with that between the subtle Creator and the phenomenal world.

Acknowledgements

This paper is a result of the BhBhS reading session held at Leiden University from September 2015 to June 2016. I would like to express my sincere appreciation to Peter C. Bisschop, Nirajan Kafle, Lidia Wojtczak, and Lucas den Boer for their helpful comments then. I would like to thank Florinda De Simini, Francesco Sferra, and the anonymous reviewer for their valuable comments on the earlier versions of the present paper. Furthermore, my thanks go to Kristen de Joseph for her proofreading the English text and suggesting various corrections. This study was financially supported by JSPS KAKENHI (grant number 21J00194).

Abbreviations

BhBhS: *Bhṛgubharadvājasamvāda* (*Mahābhārata* 12.175–185)

DhKS: *Dharmavyādahakaśikasamvāda* (*Mahābhārata* 3.198–206)

MBh: *Mahābhārata*

PCE: Sukthankar et al. 1936–1966

TB: *Taittirīyabrāhmaṇa*

References

Primary Sources

Bhāratabhavadīpa

Ed. by Pandit Ramchandrashastri Kinjawadekar. *The Mahābhārata with the Bharata Bhawadeepa Commentary of Nīlakaṇṭha*. Part 1–6. Second Edition. New Delhi: Oriental Books Reprint Corporation. 1979.

Chāndogyopaniṣad

Ed. and tr. by Patrick Olivelle. *The Early Upaniṣads: Annotated Text and Translation*. Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press. 1998.

Harivaṃśa

Ed. by P. L. Vaidya. *The Harivaṃśa: Being the Khila or Supplement to the Mahābhārata*. Volume I–II. Poona: Bhandarkar Oriental Institute. 1969–1971.

Mahābhārata

Ed. by Vishnu S. Sukthankar, S. K. Belvakar, et al. *The Mahābhārata for the First Time Critically Edited*. Volume I–XIX. Poona: Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute. 1933–1966.

Śatapathabrāhmaṇa

Ed. by Albrecht Weber. *The Śatapatha-Brāhmaṇa in the Mādhyandina-Çākhā with Extracts from the Commentaries of Sāyaṇa, Harisvāmin and Dvivedaganga*. Berlin. 1855. (Reprint: Leipzig: Otto Harrassowitz, 1924).

Taittirīyabrāhmaṇa

Kṛṣṇayajurvedīyaṃ Taittirīyabrāhmaṇaṃ Śrīmatsāyaṇācāryaviracitabhāṣya-sametam. 3 vols. Ānandāśramasamskṛtagrānthavaliḥ 37. Poona: Ānandāśrama. 1979.

Secondary Sources

Bodewitz, Henk W.

[1995] “Mahābhārata XII and RV X.129.” In Satya Pal Narang ed., *Modern Evaluation of the Mahābhārata: Prof. R. K. Sharma Felicitation Volume* (pp. 40–47). Delhi: Nag Publishers.

Böhtlingk, Otto & Rudolf Roth

[1855–1875] *Sanskrit-Wörterbuch*. Theil I–VII. St. Petersburg: Kaiserlichen Akademie der Wissenschaften.

Deussen, Paul & Otto Strauss

[1906] *Vier philosophische Texte des Mahābhāratam: Sanatsujāta-parvan, Bhagavadgītā, Mokṣadharmā, Anugītā*. Leipzig: F. A. Brockhaus.

Fitzgerald, James L.

[1980] *The Mokṣa Anthology of the Great Bhārata: An Initial Survey of Structural Issues, Themes, and Rhetorical Strategies*. The University of Chicago, Dissertation. UMI Publications.

Frauwallner, Erick

[1925] “Untersuchungen zum Mokṣadharmā: Die nichtsāmṅhyistischen Texte.” *Journal of American Oriental Society* 45: 51–67.

[1953–1956] *Geschichte der indischen Philosophie*. Band I–II. Salzburg: Otto Müller Verlag.

Gotō, Toshifumi

[1996] “Zur Lehre Śāṇḍilyas: Zwischen Brāhmaṇa und Upaniṣad.” In Nalini

Balbir, Georges-Jean Pinault, and Jean Fezas eds., *Langue, style et structure dans le monde indien: Centenaire de Louis Renou: Actes du Colloque international (Paris, 25-27 janvier 1996)*. Paris: Champion, pp. 71–89.

Hacker, Paul

[1961] “The Sāṅkhyization of the Emanation Doctrines: Shown in a Critical Analysis of Texts.” *Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Süd- und Ostasiens* 5: 75–112.

Izawa, Atsuko 伊澤敦子

[2018] “Some Remarks on Head-worship.” *Journal of Indian and Buddhist Studies* 66 (2): 967–973. (In Japanese: 「頭部崇拜に関する一考察」『印度學仏教學研究』)

[2020] “On the Seven *Prāṇas* of the Head.” *Journal of the International College for Postgraduate Buddhist Studies* 24: 137(56)–159(34). (In Japanese: 「頭部における 7 つの *prāṇa* たちについて」『国際仏教学大学院大学研究紀要』)

Johnston, E. H.

[1937] *Early Sāṃkhya: An Essay on its Historical Development According to the Texts*. London: The Royal Asiatic Society.

Motegi, Shūjun 茂木秀淳

[1995] “Religion and Philosophy of the Epic: Japanese Translation of the *Mokṣadharmaparvan* (IV)” *Journal of the Faculty of Education, Shinshu University* 84: 69–81. (In Japanese: 叙事詩の宗教哲学：Mokṣadharmaparvan 和訳研究 [IV] 『信州大学教育学部紀要』)

Olivelle, Patrick

[2006] “Heart in the Upaniṣads.” *Rivista di Studi Sudasiatici* 1: 51–67.

Takahashi, Kenji

[2019a] “The *Manas* and the *Manovahā* Channel in the *Vārṣṇeyādhyātma* of the *Mahābhārata*: A Critical Reading of *Mahābhārata* 12.207.16–29.” *Journal of Indian Philosophy* 47 (3): 421–452.

[2019b] “Gone with the Wind: The Five Elements and the Continuity of the Self in the *Bhṛgubharadvājaśāstra* (*Mahābhārata* 12.175–185).” *Journal of Indian and Buddhist Studies* 67 (3): 1055–1058.

[2019c] “Reconsidering the Developments of Accounts of Creation and Dissolution in the *Mānavadharmaśāstra* 1 and *Mahābhārata* 12.224–225.” *Journal of Indological Studies* 30/31: 129–171.

[2021] “On the Narrative Structure of the *Vārṣṇeyādhyātma* (*Mahābhārata* 12.203–210).” *Machikaneyama Ronsō, Philosophy* 55: 57–70.

Contributors

Kyoko Amano

Interorganizational Joint Researcher, Graduate School of Letters, Kyoto University.

Kenji Takahashi

Assistant Professor, the University of Tokyo.

Raffaele Torella

Emeritus Professor of Sanskrit, Sapienza University of Rome.

Chojun Yazaki

JSPS Research Fellow, Hiroshima University.

Rules about Submission of Manuscripts

Those who wish to have their papers published in the Journal are requested to send the electronic file of their manuscripts together with its hard copy and/or PDF version to the editorial committee at the office of the Association by the end of May in the year of publication. The committee will send every manuscript to one or two referees, and, on the basis of the review by the referee(s), make a judgment whether it is to be accepted or not.

Speakers at the annual meeting are expected to submit papers for publication in the next issue of the Journal. In this case, too, the papers will be refereed, and the editorial committee reserves the right to reject papers.

The contributors are requested to prepare their manuscripts with MS–Word in accordance with the Guidelines for Submission of Papers (執筆要項) given at our website (<https://indosg.org>). The proofs of accepted papers will be sent to the authors only once for proofreading. After the proofreading, no correction of the text is admitted.

Constitution of the Association

Article 1

This association is officially titled “Association for the Study of the History of Indian Thought” (インド思想史学会).

Article 2

The Association aims at promoting the study of the history of Indian thought, serving as communication link for and among those who engage in Indological studies.

Article 3

The Association shall carry out the following activities in order to accomplish its objectives.

1. holding of annual meetings
2. publication of the *Journal of Indological Studies*
3. other necessary activities

Article 4

The Association shall consist of members who agree with the objectives of the Association. Membership shall require approval of the Board of Directors. Members will be entitled to receive the Journal and to participate in the activities of the Association.

Article 5

The Association shall be maintained financially by membership fees, donations, and other sources. Membership fee is laid down separately. Membership is forfeited if the membership fees are not paid for a period of three years.

Article 6

Following officers shall form the executive body of the Association.

1. President
2. several Board Members
3. Advisors
4. several Council Members
5. two Auditors

Article 7

President represents the Association. He shall organize and carry out the activities of the Association. President shall be elected by the Members of the Board.

Article 8

Board Members organize the Board of Directors. They shall help President manage the Association and carry out the activities of the Association.

Article 9

Council Members organize the Council of the Association. They shall discuss necessary matters upon the request of President.

Article 10

Auditors shall audit the accounts of the Association.

Article 11

Officers shall serve three-year term. If approved, consecutive service is allowed.

Article 12

The account year of the Association shall begin on April 1st and end on March 31st.

Article 13

President shall set up the executive office of the Association in consultation with the Members of the Board.

Article 14

Change in the constitution shall require approval of the general meeting of the Association, which discusses the matter upon the motion of the Board.

Article 15

This constitution shall be effective on and after December 11th, 1993.

Additional provision

1. This constitution was revised on December 11th, 2004. The revised constitution shall be effective on and after the same day.

2. This constitution was revised on December 26th, 2009. The revised constitution shall be effective on and after the same day.

3. This constitution was revised on December 24th, 2022. The revised constitution shall be effective on and after the same day.

List of the Members of Executive Body (2022.4.1–2025.3.31)

President:	Akihiko Akamatsu		
Board Members:	Akihiko Akamatsu	Kyoko Amano	Mieko Kajihara
	Kei Kataoka	Yuto Kawamura	Hideki Teshima
	Eijirō Dōyama	Naoko Nishimura	Masato Fujii
	Yuko Yokochi	Kiyotaka Yoshimizu	Toshihiro Wada
Advisors:	Masaaki Hattori	Yasuke Ikari	
Council Members:	Akihiko Akamatsu	Kyoko Amano	Fumio Enomoto
	Mieko Kajihara	Kei Kataoka	Kyo Kano
	Yuto Kawamura	Toshifumi Gotō	Taisei Shida
	Masahiro Shimoda	Hideki Teshima	Eijirō Dōyama
	Naoko Nishimura	Kengo Harimoto	Masato Fujii
	Kazunobu Matsuda	Tomohiro Manabe	Izumi Miyazaki
	Michio Yano	Yuko Yokochi	Kiyotaka Yoshimizu
	Toshihiro Wada	Som Dev Vasudeva	
Auditors:	Kyo Kano	Izumi Miyazaki	
Secretariat:	Mieko Kajihara	Yuto Kawamura	Hideki Teshima
	Kengo Harimoto	Yuko Yokochi	

インド思想史学会会則

第1条 本会はインド思想史学会と称する。

第2条 本会はインド思想の研究の発展を促進し、あわせて研究者相互の連絡をはかることを目的とする。

第3条 本会はその目的を達成するために下記の事業を行う。

1. 研究集会の開催

2. 学会誌 *Journal of Indological Studies* (日本語誌名『インド学研究』)(第16・17合併号より誌名を変更。旧誌名は『インド思想史研究』)の発行

3. その他の必要な事業

第4条 本会は上記の目的に賛同する研究者をもって会員とする。但し入会には理事会の承認を必要とする。会員は本会の学会誌の配布を受け、また、本会の事業に参加することができる。

第5条 本会の維持は会員の会費と寄附金等による。会員の会費は別に定める。なお会費を3年間滞納した場合には、会員資格を失う。

第6条 本会に次の役員を置く。

- | | |
|--------|-----|
| 1. 会長 | 1 名 |
| 2. 理事 | 若干名 |
| 3. 顧問 | 若干名 |
| 4. 評議員 | 若干名 |
| 5. 監事 | 2 名 |

第7条 会長は本会を代表し、会務を統括する。会長は理事の中から互選する。

第8条 理事は理事会を組織して、会務を処理する。理事は評議員の中から互選する。

第9条 評議員は評議員会を構成し、会長の諮問に応じて重要な会務について審議する。評議員は理事会の推薦に基づき、会員総会の承認を得て決定する。

第10条 監事は会計を監査する。監事は会長が委嘱する。

第11条 役員の任期は3年とする。但し重任を妨げない。

第12条 本会の年度は毎年4月1日に始まり翌年3月31日に終る。

第13条 本会の事務局は理事会の議を経て会長が設置する。

第14条 本会則の変更は理事会の発議により、総会の議決を経て行う。

第15条 本会則は1993年12月11日より実施する。

付則

1. 本会則は2004年12月11日より改定施行する

2. 本会則は2009年12月26日より改定施行する。

3. 本会則は2022年12月24日より改定施行する。

役員名簿

(任期：2022年4月–2025年3月)

会 長	赤松明彦		
顧 問	服部正明	井狩彌介	
理 事	赤松明彦	天野恭子	梶原三恵子
	片岡啓	川村悠人	手嶋英貴
	堂山英次郎	西村直子	
	藤井正人	横地優子	吉水清孝
	和田壽弘		
評議員	赤松明彦	天野恭子	
	榎本文雄	梶原三恵子	片岡啓
	狩野恭	川村悠人	後藤敏文
	志田泰盛	下田正弘	手嶋英貴
	堂山英次郎	西村直子	
	張本研吾	藤井正人	松田和信
	眞鍋智裕	宮崎泉	矢野道雄
	横地優子	吉水清孝	和田壽弘
	Som Dev Vasudeva		
監 事	狩野恭	宮崎泉	
事務局	梶原三恵子	川村悠人	
	手嶋英貴	張本研吾	横地優子

インド学研究（旧インド思想史研究） 34, 35（合併号）

2023 年 3 月 31 日発行

編集・発行 インド思想史学会（代表者 赤松明彦）

京都市左京区吉田本町

京都大学文学研究科 インド古典学研究室気付

インド思想史学会事務局

印刷 中西印刷株式会社

京都市上京区下立売通小川東入る
